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Group Defamation in France
Jean Peytel *
T CANNOT BE SAID that there is any French legislation which
specifically protects citizens of any particular ethnic origin or
creed. For instance, there is no law that shelters members of
a particular religious faith from group defamation.
The absence of legislative texts in this connection is ex-
plicable by the tradition rooted in the French psyche, born out
of the French Revolution, that frowns upon racial discrimination
and religious intolerance. Shortly after the publication of the
Declaration of Rights by the young American Republic, the Con-
stituent Assembly, on 26th August 1789, proclaimed its famous
"Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen" which for
the first time in France established the principles of the equality
of all citizens before the law, and equality of taxation, restored
to the Protestants the rights and obligations of citizenship, and
conferred these rights and obligations on the Jews. The Declara-
tion states that men are born and remain free and equal in their
rights, that social distinctions can only be founded on the com-
mon good and that no man be called to account for his opinions,
religious or otherwise.
Since the rights of citizens belonging to ethnic or religious
minorities were the same as those of other citizens, by virtue of
principles thus laid down, no special protection was called for.
Such protection would in any case have run counter to the
principle of equality as well as to another republican and liberal
tradition which also derived from the Revolution of 1789, i.e.,
freedom of thought and expression, to state opinions orally or in
writing, and to publish such opinions on any problem, even of a
religious or racial character.
Furthermore, until very recently no special protection was
required in a nation where popular feeling was resolutely hostile
to any sort of discrimination, at least in theory. Anti-semitic
manifestations undoubtedly did occur sporadically in particular
cases as at the time of the trial of Captain Dreyfus, an event that
divided France between 1894 and 1906. But it is a fact that
anti-semitism did not represent a specific threat or characteristic
disadvantage to the ethnic or religious group at which it was
* Avocat at the Paris (France) Court of Appeals.
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aimed. Even though decried in certain quarters, this group
enjoyed all the rights of liberties of other French citizens, and
these rights and liberties were never jeopardized. Anti-semitism
in France towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning
of the 20th century was an intellectual or fashionable attitude, a
kind of snobbery, and it was only when the dark realities of the
Third Reich emerged upon the Western European scene that the
mask of anti-semitism assumed its tragic aspect.
German military power was menacingly looming on the
horizon, war was already casting its shadow, and Nazi propa-
ganda, skillful as it was in dividing peoples whom it sought to
weaken, swiftly took note of the disorders it could initiate in
France by causing the seed of anti-semitism to be sown in the
newspapers of that country. The authorities soon became aware
of the dangers of such a campaign, but lacked the means of
acting effectively to suppress these onslaughts. The courts, more
often than not, when required to consider the application of the
Law of 29th July 1881 on freedom of the Press, ruled that "gen-
eral attacks directed against indeterminate collectivities did
not amount to defamation or public insult (injures publiques)
and could not therefore justify prosecutions by persons be-
longing to these collectivities." To suppose a cause of action on
grounds of defamation or public insult, it was necessary that
the defamatory or insulting imputations complained of should
consist in a precise and specific fact and should be directed
against persons so identified that each of the members of the
plaintiff community should consider himself to have been per-
sonally wronged; on the other hand, defamatory or insulting
attacks amounting even to violent criticism of a class of citizens
or a profession did not constitute a cause of action.
It was from the standpoint of national defense that, in the
face of the Nazi danger, the Government, availing itself of the
special powers voted for this purpose by Parliament, modified
certain articles of the Press law of 29th July 1881 by a decree
passed on 21st April 1939. Although general in scope, it was the
first-and only-text which could be regarded as protection
against group defamation. The report of the Prime Minister
(President du Conseil as he was then) read as follows:
All that excites hatred, all that brings Frenchmen into
conflict with other Frenchmen, can no longer be considered
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as anything else than treason . .. Articles 32 and 33 of
the law of 29th July 1881 repress defamation and public
insult against individuals. There is no doubt that groups
possessing legal personality and competent to take legal steps
through their qualified representatives may become plain-
tiffs claiming damages in a criminal case in order to obtain
redress on the grounds of insult or defamation against them.
The question has arisen whether the same applies to a
group which is not a moral person not possessing a legal
existence enabling it to bring an action. The question is con-
troversial according to jurisprudence. In the present state
of jurisprudence it is therefore permissible to assert that
public statements tending to divide citizens or defamation
directed to that end against a group of persons cannot
easily be the subject of proceedings. In order to breach
this gap, sufficiently brought to light by a whole series of
recent facts, we propose that articles 32 and 33 (2) of the
law of 29th July 1881 be supplemented by adding thereto
provisions repressing defamation and insult committed
against a group of persons who, by reason of their origin,
belong to a particular race or creed, when the aim of such
defamation is to stimulate hatred between citizens and in-
habitants. It should be observed that the addition thus
made to the law of 29th July 1881 is not in any way of such
a nature as to alter the concept of freedom which is its
fundamental basis. There is no other aim than to coordinate
this concept with those that are inseparable from the Re-
publican motto itself (Liberty-Equality-Fraternity). In
this context, no reason drawn from race or religion can dis-
rupt the equality of citizens; no reservation born out of
circumstances of heredity can, in respect of one of them, in-
fringe the feeling of brotherhood which unites all the mem-
bers of the French family. But it is not, really speaking, their
interests which are at stake in this connection, but rather
that of the national collectivity.
The texts amended by the Decree of 21st April 1939 are
the following:
Art. 32 of the Law of 29th July 1881 (2nd paragraph)
Defamation committed by the same means' against a group
of persons not designated by article 31 of the present law,
but who, by their origin, belong to a particular race or
religion, shall be punished by imprisonment, varying be-
tween one month and one year and a fine between 500 to
10,000 francs, 2 when its purpose is to incite citizens or in-
habitants to hatred of one another.
I The means referred to in the new articles 32 and 33 of the law of 29th
July 1881, are "speeches, shouts or threats proffered in public places or at
(Continued on next page)
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Art. 33 of the same law (2nd paragraph)
Insults committed in like manner (see n. 1, above) against
individuals, when it shall not have been preceded by provoca-
tion, shall be punished by imprisonment varying between
five days and two months and a fine varying between 16
or 300 francs, or either of these penalties alone. The maxi-
mum term of imprisonment shall be of six months and the
maximum amount of the fine shall be 500 francs3 if the insult
was proffered against a group of persons who, on account of
their origin, belong to a particular race or creed, for the
purpose of inciting the citizens or inhabitants to hatred of
one another.
These texts, promulgated on the eve of World War II in
order to avoid divisions in the French nation, were not applied
frequently before the invasion of France in May and June 1940.
It goes without saying that during the period of German oc-
cupation (1940-1944) they were not applied to protect members
of the Jewish faith, abominably persecuted by the occupying
forces, against whom the so-called Vichy Government had pro-
mulgated exceptional legislation which was annulled by the
ordinance of 9th August 1944 which restored republican
legality. It is therefore only after the liberation of France
by the allied armies that significant applications of these texts
by the courts are to be found. If the truth be told, judges have
shown the greatest caution, even a certain shyness, in applying
the repressive texts of 1939, perhaps because they considered
that the reasons relating to the national interest which had
given rise to these amendments to articles 32 and 33 of the Law
of 1881 no longer obtained.
The fact remains that certain decisions required the existence
of incitement to violence in order to punish defamation against
an ethnic or religious entity. The Court of Cassation felt it
necessary to recall on several occasions, by quashing the judg-
ments of the Court of Appeal, that such defamation is punishable
when, without a call to violence, its aim is to stimulate hatred
(Continued from preceding page)
public meetings, written or printed, sold, distributed, offered for sale or ex-
hibited in public places or at public meetings, posters or hoardings, exposed
to the public eye, as well as sketches, illustrations, paintings or emblems
exposed to the public eye, offered for sale, peddled or distributed."
2 The 1939 text refers to old francs. The current rate of the fine is between
300 and 300,000 new francs, i.e., in round figures between $60 and $60,000.
3 The 1939 text refers to old francs. The current rate of the fine is between
150 and 150,000 new francs, i.e., in round figures between $30 and $3,000.
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between citizens or inhabitants (Cf. Cassation Criminelle 26th
June 1952, Dalloz 1952-page 641-and 26th June 1954, Dalloz
1954-page 646). For instance, a ruling rendered in 1952 by the
Supreme Court quashed a decision of the Court of Appeal of
Paris, which had held that defamatory imputations against Jewish
doctors inserted in a newspaper did not fall within the pro-
visions of article 32 of the law of 29th July 1881, on the mistaken
ground that, in order that such imputations should be punished,
the article required an intention on the part of the author of
the libelous statements to incite citizens and inhabitants to
social disorders and disturbances and, in consequence, to violence.
Case law on this score nevertheless remains generally very
restrictive and is expressed, inter alia, in a decision of the Court
of Appeal of Paris of 26th March 1952 (Dalloz 1953, page 342).
It held that although insults and libelous statements against a
group of persons who belonged to the Jewish religion were con-
tained in an article advising "healthy suspicion" of Jews, re-
garded them as foreigners, and advocated a "balanced and
reasonable anti-semitism" with "just and necessary laws," it was
not however established that it was the intention of the author of
the article concerned to conjure up feelings of passion, such as
hatred, since he called for the exercise of reason, and not passion,
and furthermore stated that his ideas were opposed to what he
himself described as "ignoble German and racist persecution."
Jurisprudence is now clearly marked out, and the scope
of the protection afforded by the criminal law is therefore re-
stricted to instances where the purpose of speeches, writings,
pictures is to incite hatred, not only as between citizens, but also
as between the inhabitants of France.
Side by side with the criminal law, which sanctions the
offences of insults and defamation against ethnic and religious
groups, and enables the victims to intervene as plaintiffs claim-
ing damages in a criminal case independently of the fine exacted
by the State, the possibility of seeking a remedy in the
courts of civil jurisdiction is to be found in the fundamental
principles of law and the Civil Code; compensation may be
sought from those who, by their tortious acts, cause
prejudice to persons belonging to any particular ethnic or re-
ligious group. A case in point is refusal to grant employment,
or maneuvers tending to the wrongful dismissal of an em-
ployee of a particular faith. The texts which may be relied
Jan., 1964
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1964
GROUP DEFAMATION (FRANCE)
upon are very general in character: Articles 1382 and 1383 of the
Civil Code.4 In order that damages should be awarded against
the defendant under these articles, French jurisprudence re-
quires three elements to be present: a tort, damage, and a causal
link between the tort and the damage suffered. Although it is
relatively easy to show damage and its imputability to the facts
alleged by the plaintiff, the tortious act is generally more difficult
to establish. There cannot be any question of a tort as a moral
concept. But relative to a tort considered as a breach of the
legal order, certain writers have defined this as the breach of a
pre-existing obligation. The result is that each particular case
sets a very delicate problem of appreciation to the courts. How-
ever, proceedings have been instituted on the basis laid down
by the French Constitution, and this indirectly takes us back
to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.
On 4th October 1958, the French People adopted a new
Constitution, with a preamble which reads as follows:
The French People solemnly proclaims its attachment
to the Rights of Man and to the principles of national sov-
ereignty such as they have been defined by the Declaration
of 1789, as confirmed and completed by the preamble to the
Constitution of 1946.
The preamble of the 1946 Constitution to which reference
is made, is worded as follows:
On the morrow of the victory won by the free peoples
over regimes which have attempted to enslave and to de-
grade the human person, the French People once again pro-
claim that every human being, without any distinction of
race, religion or creed, possesses inalienable and sacred
rights. It solemnly re-affirms the rights of Man and of the
Citizen enshrined in the Declaration of Rights of 1789 and
the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Re-
public.
Finally, Article 2 of the Constitution of 1958 proclaims
that France "ensures the equality before the law of all citizens,
without any distinction of origin, race or religion."
However general in character these texts may be, it none-
theless results that any act whose effect is to disrupt the equality
4 Art. 1382-Any act whatsoever by any person which causes damage to
another obliges the person by whose fault the damage has occurred to make
good such damage. Civ. 1348-1 ° .
Art. 1383-Every person is responsible for the damage occasioned by him,
not only by his act, but through his negligence or his imprudence. Civ. 1382;
Pdn. 319 s; R. 26; R. 30; R. 34; R. 38; R. 40.
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of citizens before the law is a breach of a pre-existing obliga-
tion and, consequently, is a tort giving rise to an action for
damages. Any racial or religious discrimination may therefore
be held to be tortious in the absolute discretion of the Courts.
It should nevertheless be pointed out that no constant juris-
prudence has yet been established on the basis of these texts,
and that certain associations as well as members of Parliament
have submitted draft legislation with regard to the recruitment
in industrial or commercial undertakings of employees not
belonging to what is termed in the United States the "Caucasian
race."
The legislative provisions must also be mentioned which
enable the consequences of group defamation to be indirectly
countered:
(1) Change of Name. Article 1 of the revolutionary law of
the 6th Fructidor, Year II (25th August 1794)-which is still
in force-prohibits the assumption of a name other than that
to which an individual is entitled by virtue of his birth certificate
or, more precisely, his ascendance; but this rule as to the im-
mutability of patronymic appellation is not entirely absolute:
a change of name may, inter alia, be granted by way of govern-
mental authorization. The law of 11th Germinal, Year XI (1st
April 1803), supplemented by subsequent texts, established a
change of name procedure by decree (a governmental act) passed
on the advice of the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat), this in-
stitution being the supreme administrative tribunal in France.
In order to obtain an authorization of change of name, an
interest must be justified, whose nature it is for the government
to appreciate, following upon an inquiry made by the Council
of State and the delivery of favorable opinion by that body. In
former times administrative practice was fairly strict; in regard
to foreign sounding names, the principle of the gallicizing of the
name was not admitted, but certain names could be altered,
by reason of difficulties of pronunciation. With regard to names
usually borne by Jews, practice prior to 1940 was not in favor
of authorizing changes which might have appeared as running
counter to egalitarian notions. During the period of German
occupation, under the Vichy government, the law of 10 Febru-
ary 1942 prohibited Jews from changing their names. This law,
which formed part of the exceptional measures taken against
Jews, was of course repealed in 1944.
Jan., 1964
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But since the liberation of France, the events of 1940-1944
and the odious persecution to which French Jews, as all other
European Jews, were subjected, have led the Council of State to
agree far more readily to the changing of names habitually borne
by Jews, whether owners were of Israelite origin or not. At its
General Assembly of 6th March 1947, the Council of State,
taking into account the racial persecution of the occupation
period, did in fact express the opinion that persons with patro-
nyms reputedly Jewish could for that reason alone be authorized
to change these patronyms.
(2) Changes of First Names. With the same object of fusion
or assimilation in mind, the post-war legislators introduced an
innovation by abolishing a principle of French law which was
still in force, viz., the immutability of an individual's first name
or names, which, even more than the patronymic name, was re-
garded as immutable by French legislation. No legal provision
existed enabling a first name to be changed, whereas, as has been
seen above, it was possible to change a patronym by decree. How-
ever, on the one hand, ridiculous or undesirable first names
are bestowed on many children, and on the other hand, it was con-
sidered pointless to authorize Jews to change their names, in
order to integrate them in the national community, if they were
forced to retain first names of Hebrew origin which stressed
their origin. On this score, article 57 of the Civil Code has been
supplemented by the following provisions of the law of 12th
October 1955:
The first names of a child as shown on his birth certificate
may, if a legitimate interest is established, be altered by
judgment of the civil courts delivered at the request of
the child, or, during his minority, at the request of his legal
representative. The judgment shall be rendered and pub-
lished in the conditions provided for in articles 99 and 101
of the present Code. The addition of other first names may
in like manner be decided upon.
The intention of the legislation has been to institute a simpler,
easier and swifter method to effect a change of first names than
the cumbersome administrative procedure applicable to changes
of name. The aim has only partly been fulfilled, because the ap-
plication of the law of 1955 has had to face the resistance of the
courts, which still clung to the classical rule of the immutability
of first names. Most of the courts called upon to give a ruling
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on applications submitted by Jews wishing to change their
names have interpreted the words "legitimate reasons" in the
law in question as meaning a major and exceptional interest,
and have held that such an interest could not be evidenced, or
at least that it had no current existence as "racial prejudices
did not flourish on French soil." A certain number of appeals
have been lodged with the Court of Cassation, and rulings have
not yet been given, but it is most likely that these will favor a
very liberal interpretation of the law of 1955. A curious historical
detail is noteworthy: An imperial decree made by Napoleon
the 1st prohibits Jews from selecting first names of biblical
origin for their children. This decree is obsolete and has never
been applied, but yet it has never been repealed. It did not
spring from anti-semitic views; on the contrary, the Emperor
did in fact wish to promote the complete integration of French
Jews who, until the Revolution, had lived a marginal existence
in France. The imperial decree mentioned has been invoked on
several occasions to support changes of first names.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion to the present study, it must be noted
that French legislation against group defamation is very restricted
and that, on the whole, the body of case law does not favor its
very intensive or liberal application. This trend, however, is
merely a manifestation of adherence to general principles, ac-
cording to which there does not exist any racial or religious dis-
crimination in France, and the conviction that any law which
purports to protect any particular category of French citizens is
as dangerous, both for the nation and for the groups concerned
themselves, as a discriminatory law.
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